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Abstract
We examine the persistence of socioeconomic status across generations, measured by educa-
tional attainment, among urban Chinese born between 1930 and 1985. The persistence of
status follows a pronounced, robust U-shaped pattern, falling among cohorts educated fol-
lowing the Communist revolution of 1949, and rising among cohorts educated following the
reforms of the late 1970s. The pattern is not driven by the Cultural Revolution or by chang-
ing associations between education and income. The U-shape also appears in complementary
datasets covering rural China. We discuss the policies behind a non-monotonic relationship
between educational expansion and social mobility across the institutional regimes we study.
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1 Introduction
Economists are increasingly interested in documenting long-run trends in economic inequality and
social mobility, which both shed light on the consequences of economic and political changes across
time, and also inform contemporary social policy by placing current outcomes in historical perspec-
tive.1 Recent work by Lee and Solon (2009), Chetty et al. (2014), and Clark (2014) suggests that
rates of social mobility may be both low and stubbornly stable across time and across countries,
which would suggest that social and economic policies aimed at increasing mobility may have little
effect, and that current inequality will inevitably be replicated in future generations.2 Other work
suggests that social mobility might vary quite significantly across time and place (see, for example,
Hertz et al., 2007), and Long and Ferrie, 2014).
In this paper, we use a retrospective, representative survey of urban Chinese households (the
Chinese Urban Household Education and Employment Survey, 2004, or UHS) to examine social
mobility among cohorts of Chinese children born between 1930 and 1985. We find that the inter-
generational transmission of status follows a pronounced and robust U-shaped pattern over the 20th
century. While we cannot identify specific causal factors behind the U-shaped pattern of status
persistence, there is a striking match between the timing of changes in social mobility and changes
in Chinese political, economic, and educational institutions. Cohorts educated under the “Maoist”
regime (born between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s, and educated between the 1950s and the
1970s) experienced significantly greater social mobility (significantly lower status persistence) than
individuals educated in Republican China (born in the 1930s and early 1940s). Then, social nobility
fell (status persistence increased) among cohorts educated under the post-Mao, “Reform” regime
of Deng Xiaoping (cohorts born in the mid-1960s or later, educated in the middle of the 1970s and
later).3 We find this pattern not only among a representative sample of urban Chinese, but also
in complementary data sources on rural China (the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement
Surveys used by Hertz et al., 2007, and the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study).
1See, for example, Goldin and Margo (1992), Katz and Murphy (1993), Piketty and Saez (2003), Clark (2014),
and Chetty et al. (2014).
2Piketty (2014) makes a related argument, that in the absence of negative shocks to the stock of wealth (such
as wars), relatively high rates of return to capital tend to produce a class of individuals who accumulate ever larger
shares of wealth over time.
3The economic consequences of China’s reforms have been widely discussed (for example, Naughton, 1995, and
Brandt and Rawski, 2008). Note that political institutions, too, have evolved in recent decades—see Martinez-Bravo
et al. (2013).
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In Figure 1, we present raw data illustrating our basic findings, plotting children’s educational
attainment—our measure of socioeconomic status—against father’s educational attainment for the
three institutional regimes we study (“Pre-Mao”, “Mao”, and “Post-Mao”).4 In the left-hand panel
of Figure 1, educational attainment is simply measured as years of schooling, and one can see that
the slope of the relationship between fathers’ and children’s schooling flattens as one moves from the
Pre-Mao to the Mao-era cohorts, then steepens again moving from the Mao-era cohorts to the post-
Mao cohorts. In the right-hand panel, we use the percentile rank of a child’s education within their
five-year birth cohort (a rank of 100 indicates the highest education level in the cohort) as a measure
of children’s education and fathers’ education rank among fathers of children in that cohort as a
measure of fathers’ educational attainment. Using this alternative measure of educational status,
one sees the same pattern: fathers’ education has a much larger effect on children’s education
among the pre-Mao and post-Mao cohorts than among the Mao-era cohorts.
Our findings suggest that social mobility is not immutable, although meaningfully altering
the persistence of socioeconomic status may require fundamental institutional and policy changes.
While our primary focus is on documenting the broad pattern of social mobility in China over
the 20th century (rather than isolating and identifying particular causal mechanisms), historical
evidence suggests that differences in educational policy may be an important determinant of the
social mobility patterns we observe. Shortly after taking power, in 1949, the Chinese Communist
Party implemented a radical program in the 1950s aimed at increasing economic equality, and
increasing the poor’s access to education.5 Our findings suggest that schooling expansion that
is explicitly aimed at improving access to mass education can generate increased social mobility,
though we cannot identify here the relative importance of schooling expansion and other policy
changes.6
4We use fathers’ education as an indicator of parents’ status because women’s access to education varied sig-
nificantly across time and space, thus making it a noisier measure of parental status (for a discussion of changes
in women’s education across time, see Lavely et al., 1990). Including mother’s education level as an input in our
measure of parents’ status does not affect our results, however.
5The next several decades saw both economic growth and humanitarian disasters such as the failed “Great Leap
Forward” and the associated famine (Meng et al., 2014), and then the Cultural Revolution. The effects of radical
institutional change on economic outcomes are studied by Acemoglu et al. (2011), among others.
6Nybom and Stuhler (2014) show that variation in social mobility across time need not result from contempo-
raneous policy changes, but rather may result from “echoes” of earlier changes in the distribution of education.
Importantly, our findings of increased social mobility in the Maoist era, followed by reduced mobility in the Reform
era, are likely not produced by the sort of non-monotonic effects of educational expansion across generations studied
by Nybom and Stuhler (2014). The non-monotonicity in their work comes from higher correlations between parents’
endowments and incomes when a more meritocratic education system is implemented for the parents’ generation. In
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Figure 1: Transmission of educational status by institutional regime. The figure plots children’s
education against fathers’ education (along with the best-fit linear relationship) by institutional
regime. Children are assigned to regimes as follows: “Pre-Mao” children were born between 1930
and 1944 (inclusive); “Mao” regime children were born between 1945 and 1964 (inclusive); and,
“Post-Mao” regime children were born between 1965 and 1984 (inclusive). The left-hand panel
uses years of schooling as a measure of educational attainment for both children and fathers. The
right-hand panel uses the percentile rank of a child’s education among children born in the same
five-year birth cohort (a rank of 100 indicates the highest education level in the cohort) as a measure
of children’s educational attainment; fathers’ educational attainment is measured using the father’s
education rank among fathers of children born in a particular five-year birth cohort.
We also find evidence that expansionary educational policies need not be equalizing : educa-
tional attainment and expenditures continued to grow in the Reform era, as social mobility fell.7
We present qualitative and quantitative evidence suggesting that, in contrast to the educational
expansion of the Maoist era, the benefits of educational expansion in recent decades have gone
our setting, the expansion of schooling in the Maoist era was explicitly not meritocratic—it was “equalizing”, using
affirmative action (we discuss this in detail in Section 3). Thus, if anything, one would expect a lower correlation
between incomes and ability among the parents of children born in the Reform era, which would tend to produce
greater social mobility in the Reform era, not less.
7Parman (2011) finds that educational expansion in the United States was associated with reduced social mobility
across the 20th century.
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predominantly to elites. China, and many other developing countries, may face a trade-off between
investing in meritocratic education designed to foster innovation and management expertise (but
favoring the children of the existing elite), versus broad schooling that raises the human capital of
the lower part of the distribution.8
These results contribute to a vast microeconometric literature on intergenerational mobility
and the persistence of economic outcomes (see Solon, 1999, and Black and Devereux, 2011, for
reviews). Our paper follows recent work that has examined the correlations between parents’ and
children’s incomes and endowments comparatively: across time (Aaronson and Mazumder, 2008;
Clark, 2014; and Chetty et al., 2014); across countries (Ichino et al., 2011; Abbott and Gallipoli,
2014); across levels of development (Hertz et al., 2007, and Long and Ferrie, 2014); and even across
pre-industrial societies (Borgerhoff Mulder, Bowles, Hertz et al., 2009).9 One important area of
research has been the relationship between intergenerational persistence and structural change of
the broader economy. Our work contributes empirical evidence on the question of whether economic
development arising from structural change disproportionately benefits the children of the already
well-off, or rather, jostles the pre-existing hierarchy and increases social mobility.
Research on economic mobility in China has grown rapidly in recent years, at least in part
motivated by concerns about China’s growing economic inequality (see Piketty and Qian, 2009,
Meng et al., 2013, and Li et al., 2013b).10 Recent work has often examined contemporary social
mobility using a single cross-section of children. For example, Gong et al. (2010), using a 2004
cross-section, find that intergenerational mobility is very low in urban China relative to other
countries, in contrast to Guo and Min (2008), who find a very high level of mobility using the same
data (but not accounting for life-cycle effects). Knight and Li (1993) and Knight, Li, and Deng
(2009) present evidence on educational status transmission from the 1988 and 2002 waves of the
China Household Income Project (CHIP), respectively, finding that children’s education levels are
affected both by their region of birth, as well as by their parents’ educational attainment.11
8Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013) discuss the political economy of the choice of educational content in developing
countries. Bai and Jia (2014) describe the importance of education as a mechanism of social mobility in imperial
China.
9Corak (2012) shows that, within OECD countries, cross-sectional inequality is correlated with intergenerational
persistence of income, what has been dubbed the “Great Gatsby Curve”.
10Chinese citizens are asked to tolerate high levels of inequality with the promise that they (or their children) might
rise up the socioeconomic ladder; indeed, President Xi Jinping’s policy theme of the “Chinese Dream” is redolent of
the hope for upward socioeconomic mobility.
11Relatedly, Wang (2013) shows that father-in-law social networks are important for men’s labor market outcomes.
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Some evidence exists on changes in social mobility in China across long periods of time and
multiple institutional regimes. Campbell and Lee (2008) examine social mobility before and after
the Communist takeover, and find that social mobility was not affected by this dramatic institu-
tional change. Their work is, however, limited to a small, non-representative sample of Chinese
families.12 Deng and Treiman (1997) examine mobility before and after the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1976), and find that mobility increased during the Cultural Revolution period, consistent
with our findings. It is worth noting, however, that we find significant increases in social mobility
in the Maoist era even prior to the Cultural Revolution, and excluding the cohorts most affected
by it. Wu and Treiman (2004) examine the rate of rural-to-urban transitions in hukou status (an
important mechanism of mobility in contemporary China), and find little change following China’s
economic reforms. Walder and Hu (2009) examine the composition of Chinese elites from 1949 to
1996. They find mixed results: CCP membership was relatively more open after reforms, and elite
non-governmental positions were as open after reforms as they were before; on the other hand, elite
governmental positions were transmitted more effectively across generations among Party elites.13
Some recent work, like ours, also uses retrospective data from representative social surveys
to study changes in social mobility across time. Much of this research has used the CHIP series
to construct observations of parent-child outcomes across cohorts, mainly for rural households.14
Sato and Li (2007) study the impact of family class background (e.g., coming from a family of
landowners) on rural children’s educational outcomes in the three periods we study. They find
that descendants of landowners attained relatively high levels of schooling in the Republican era,
then relatively low levels in the Maoist era, then high levels again in the Reform era. Knight et
al. (2013) use the CHIP data to study intergenerational transmission of educational status among
both urban and rural Chinese, but present very little evidence on status transmission prior to 1940,
thus missing cohorts educated in the Republican era (the evidence they do present is consistent
with our findings). Finally, in another analysis of cohorts educated in the Maoist and Reform eras
(based on the Chinese Family Panel Studies, 2010, and the CHIP data), Fan et al. (2013) find
12While we find contrasting results, it is important to note that we are unable to take into account information on
the extended family, as do Campbell and Lee.
13Walder and Hu also find that certain types of status transmission were sharply curtailed during the Cultural
Revolution.
14Note that rural education, and children’s outcomes more generally, during the Maoist period were undoubtedly
affected by the Great Famine. We focus on the urban population, which was much less affected by the famine (Meng
et al., 2014).
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reduced social mobility post-1970, consistent with our results.
While other scholars have examined patterns of social mobility in China across institutional
regimes, our findings represent novel, direct evidence on the transmission of educational attainment
between fathers and children in China, covering the Republican era, the Maoist era, and the Reform
era—across both urban and rural China. As such, we believe we are the first to highlight the U-
shaped pattern of the persistence of educational attainment across generations.15
Our analysis overcomes several important concerns in the empirical literature on social mobility.
First, we mitigate concerns about attenuation bias arising from the use of yearly income as a
(noisy) measure of economic and social status by instead considering educational attainment as
our indicator. In addition, we examine both the levels and the ranks of fathers and children in the
educational attainment distribution for a child’s birth cohort, because China saw large changes in
the distribution of educational attainment across cohorts.16
We also address several important questions surrounding our findings of low rates of persistence
of educational attainment (i.e., high social mobility) in the Maoist era. First, one might wonder if,
despite the fact that education is measured with less noise than income, it is a result of measurement
error in the independent variable. We do not believe this is the case: attenuation bias from
measurement error seems likely to more significantly affect measurement of educational attainment
among the earlier cohorts educated in Republican China than cohorts educated in the Maoist era;
yet estimates of persistence of status are greater for the earlier cohorts. One might also wonder
if greater social mobility is simply the result of the disruption of education during the Cultural
Revolution. In fact, we find that persistence of education across generations is quite low (mobility
is extremely high) for cohorts born between 1945 and 1950, the vast majority of whom would have
completed their educations in the Maoist era, but prior to the Cultural Revolution. In addition, we
find that education levels rose throughout the period we study, indicating that high social mobility
was not simply a result of low overall levels of schooling in Communist China prior to the economic
15Sato and Li (2007) present a related, though very much distinct, finding: that the fortunes of the descendants of
the landowning rural elite followed something like a U-shape across the institutional regimes we study. An important
difference between our results and theirs (beyond the differences in empirical specifications and samples) is that
children from formerly rural elite families who Sato and Li find attained high levels of education in the post-Mao era
were born to parents who would have had relatively little schooling (because their educations occurred during the
Maoist era, when the children of the rural elite attained low levels of education). This would suggest high levels of
mobility in the post-Mao era, for at least a subset of the population, in contrast to our findings.
16The advantages of examining status transmission or social mobility in terms of ranks rather than absolute
outcomes are discussed in Chetty et al. (2014).
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reforms.17
A final question is whether education is a good proxy for status across the three eras we study.
Qualitatively, education has been the metric of social status in China for more than one thousand
years (see Elman, 2000); however, the educated elite was certainly stigmatized in the Maoist era. To
answer the question quantitatively, we examine the correlation between income and education across
the institutional regimes we study. In addition to asking about incomes in the year of the survey
(2004), the UHS includes data on the last pre-retirement salary earned by retired individuals, which
provides information on earnings in different years. While this information is generally unavailable
for cohorts retiring prior to 1960, we can estimate the correlation between education and final
income for cohorts retiring during the Maoist and Reform eras. For both of these periods, we find
a strong, statistically significant correlation between educational attainment and income (and we
show that this relationship is not driven by Communist Party membership, a potential confounding
factor). To study the relationship between education and income in the Republican era, we turn
to the 1929 employee records of the Tianjin-Pukou Railroad, a rare early source of individual-level
data on both earnings and educational attainment (see Yuchtman, 2014). We show that the returns
to schooling in the Republican era were positive and statistically significant as well, suggesting that
our proxy for socioeconomic status is a good one across the entire period.
In the remainder of the paper, we present our empirical analysis in Section 2. We then discuss
the policies (and politics) behind a non-monotonic relationship between educational expansion and
social mobility across the institutional regimes we study, in Section 3. We summarize the paper
and offer concluding thoughts in Section 4.
2 Inequality and intergenerational mobility in 20th century China
We begin by briefly describing our primary dataset (the UHS), then present long-run patterns of
social mobility in urban China. We then estimate a variety of specifications using the UHS data,
and also present evidence on social mobility among rural Chinese using data from Hertz et al.
17It is necessary to note that not all of the increased mobility resulted from benign policy changes in the Maoist era,
either before or during the Cultural Revolution. Coercion and limiting the educational opportunities of the children
of the educated elite were involved as well. Zhou (2004), page 18, writes that “the ‘Anti-Rightist Campaign’ [of 1957]
purged over 530,000 ‘rightists,’ over 10 percent of the intellectuals at the time.” During the Cultural Revolution,
young people were forcibly “sent down” to the country-side; Zhou (2004), pages 134–135, finds that the probability
of being sent down was positively associated with fathers’ education.
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(2007) and the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. We finally examine whether
education earned economic returns across the three regimes we study, and consider alternative
measures of socioeconomic status.
2.1 The Chinese Urban Household Education and Employment Survey
Our data come from a retrospective survey of Chinese urban households, the Chinese Urban House-
hold Education and Employment Survey, 2004, or UHS. The survey was conducted jointly by
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Peking University, and includes individuals from 12
provinces (Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Liaoning, Shaanxi,
Shanxi, Sichuan, and Zhejiang). Fan et al. (2010) describe the UHS sampling procedure: the
survey used probability-proportional-to-size sampling from strata at the provincial, city, county,
town, and neighborhood levels; households selected for the survey were randomly drawn from each
neighborhood selected.18
Our analysis will focus on men and women who were household heads in 2004 (and so responded
to the survey), as well as their fathers, sons, and daughters (about whom questions were asked in
the survey).19 Because we can link household heads both to their parents and to their children,
we are able to study father-child pairs in which the child was born as early as the 1920s (when
household heads were old, and reported on their parents), as well as pairs in which the child was
born more recently (young household heads reporting on their parents and the children of middle-
aged household heads). Our analysis of cohorts ends with individuals born in the mid-1980s, as
later cohorts would not have had time to complete their education at the time of the survey.
The UHS contains household head, parent, and child demographic information, data on educa-
tional attainment, and economic outcomes such as current total income, or final (pre-retirement)
labor market income for retired or deceased individuals. We present summary statistics for vari-
ables of interest among the children we study, and their fathers, in Table 1, splitting the sample by
the institutional “regime” in which children were educated.20 We show information on education
18The sampling frame is the same as that used by China’s National Bureau of Statistics Urban Household Income
and Expenditure Survey (UHIES), which itself has been widely used (see, e.g., Iyer et al., 2013).
19As noted above, we do not focus on information about mothers as we view fathers’ education levels as better
indicators of parental status than mothers’ across the period we study; including mothers’ information does not affect
our results, however.
20In Appendix Table A1, one can see the number of children in each five-year birth cohort as well as children’s
average schooling levels, fathers’ average schooling level, etc., by five-year birth cohort.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Children and their Fathers in
the UHS, by Institutional Regime
mean sd n
Pre-Mao Birth Cohorts
Education 9.8 3.8 1196
Education Rank 54.0 28.9 1196
CCP Member 0.4 0.5 1196
Age 65.2 3.9 1196
Urban Native 0.5 0.5 1196
Current Income 13598.1 10616.4 1067
Pre-Retirement Income 8196.4 8826.9 1048
Retirement Year 1995.3 5.4 1051
Female 0.4 0.5 1196
Father’s Education 4.4 4.2 1196
Father’s Education Rank 50.5 28.8 1196
Father CCP Member 0.1 0.3 1196
Father Urban Native 0.1 0.3 1196
Father’s Pre-Retirement Income 1930.4 3246.7 215
Father’s Retirement Year 1976.6 8.4 227
Mao-Era Birth Cohorts
Education 10.7 2.8 9396
Education Rank 51.6 28.9 9396
CCP Member 0.3 0.5 9390
Age 47.4 5.3 9396
Urban Native 0.7 0.4 9396
Current Income 15775.5 19920.8 8752
Pre-Retirement Income 8911.0 9086.0 1598
Retirement Year 2000.7 3.2 1595
Female 0.5 0.5 9396
Father’s Education 5.8 4.1 9396
Father’s Education Rank 50.6 29.0 9396
Father CCP Member 0.3 0.5 9396
Father’s Age 71.2 12.5 9358
Father Urban Native 0.4 0.5 9396
Father’s Income 11936.1 11170.9 3420
Father’s Pre-Retirement Income 4475.3 8175.7 4915
Father’s Retirement Year 1986.6 7.4 5029
Table continues below . . .
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Children and their Fathers in
the UHS, by Institutional Regime (continued)
mean sd n
Post-Mao Birth Cohorts
Education 12.1 2.9 5830
Education Rank 52.2 29.3 5830
CCP Member 0.2 0.4 5827
Age 33.9 3.9 5830
Urban Native 0.7 0.4 5830
Current Income 15602.2 14280.2 5280
Female 0.6 0.5 5830
Father’s Education 7.5 3.9 5830
Father’s Education Rank 50.7 29.1 5830
Father CCP Member 0.4 0.5 5830
Father’s Age 63.7 7.9 5760
Father Urban Native 0.6 0.5 5830
Father’s Income 12635.2 15821.0 3275
Father’s Pre-Retirement Income 8326.8 8605.6 3125
Father’s Retirement Year 1995.7 6.1 3159
All Birth Cohorts
Education 11.1 3.0 16422
Education Rank 52.0 29.0 16422
CCP Member 0.3 0.5 16413
Age 43.9 9.9 16422
Urban Native 0.7 0.5 16422
Current Income 15561.1 17594.6 15099
Pre-Retirement Income 8605.9 9308.1 2676
Retirement Year 1998.6 5.0 2657
Female 0.5 0.5 16422
Father’s Education 6.3 4.1 16422
Father’s Education Rank 50.6 29.0 16422
Father CCP Member 0.3 0.5 16422
Father’s Age 68.5 12.0 16286
Father Urban Native 0.4 0.5 16422
Father’s Income 12311.3 14234.5 6781
Father’s Pre-Retirement Income 5867.1 8482.0 8255
Father’s Retirement Year 1989.7 8.5 8415
Children are assigned to institutional regimes as follows: “Pre-Mao” children
were born between 1930 and 1944 (inclusive); “Mao” regime children were
born between 1945 and 1964 (inclusive); and, “Post-Mao” regime children
were born between 1965 and 1984 (inclusive). Education, for children and
fathers, is measured in years; Education Rank is a child’s rank (1 = lowest,
100 = highest) within his or her five-year birth cohort; Father’s Education
Rank is the rank of the father’s education among the other fathers within a
child’s five-year birth cohort; the CCP Member variable is a dummy variable
equal to one if a child or father is a member of the Chinese Communist Party;
Age is measured in years; Urban Native is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
children or fathers acquired their hukou status by age 2; Current Income is
the reported total income of a child or father in 2004; Pre-retirement Income
is a child’s or father’s final salary prior to retiring (if applicable); Retirement
Year is the final year of work for a child or father; Female is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a child is female. All data come from the 2004 UHS, described
in the text.
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levels, Communist Party membership status, age, “native” urban hukou status21, earnings, and
gender.
While the UHS sample was constructed to be broadly representative of urban Chinese house-
holds, it is worthwhile to compare the characteristics of the sample we study to the characteristics
of the Chinese (urban) population in the provinces from which the UHS sampled. Because we
examine variation in status transmission across institutional regimes, it is of interest to examine
both the overall representativeness of the UHS sample, and also to examine whether the degree to
which the UHS is representative varies across time (this could be thought of as a test of “balance”
across regimes).
In Table 2, we compare the characteristics of children born between 1930 and 1984 in the UHS
dataset to individuals in the 2005 Chinese census 1% sample who were born between 1930 and
1984 and who have urban hukou status, in the provinces included in the UHS data.22 The two
datasets are compared in the fraction of individuals who are male and in individuals’ educational
attainment.23 We present this comparison of summary statistics both for the entire 1930–1984
period and by institutional regime. One can see that overall, the UHS dataset has slightly fewer
men born between 1930 and 1984 than does the Chinese census; education levels in the UHS are also
slightly lower than in the census, though the difference is less than one-half of a year of schooling.
Examining the representativeness of the UHS sample across institutional regimes, one can see
that in each regime there are small differences between the UHS sample and the census sample:
among the pre-Mao cohorts, the UHS sample has a slightly higher fraction male and slightly higher
education level; the differences are reversed for the Mao-era and post-Mao cohorts.24 Below, we
re-weight the UHS data to match the age distribution and educational attainment in the census
to determine whether the differences between the UHS sample and the broader Chinese urban
population play a role in generating the social mobility patterns that we observe. Using the re-
21A household’s hukou status is its official, registered location of residency, with urban status being particularly
valuable (see Li et al., 2010). We define “native” urban hukou status as acquiring the right to live in an urban area
by age 2.
22The census was conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. See
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/200603/t20060322 25744.html (last accessed June 3, 2015).
23To make educational attainment comparable between the two datasets, we convert educational levels completed
in the census into years of schooling, and compare this to the analogous variable for the UHS data (highest level of
schooling completed converted into years).
24In Appendix Figure A1 we also present the distribution of births across time in the UHS dataset and in the
Chinese census. One can see that the UHS dataset captures the peaks and valleys in the birth distribution seen in
the census, though the UHS sample slightly under-represents the oldest birth cohorts as well as the youngest.
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weighted data does not affect these patterns, supporting our use of the UHS sample as a broadly,
albeit not perfectly, representative sample of the urban Chinese population.
2.2 Long-run trends in inequality and social mobility
Our empirical analysis will focus on the relationship between child’s education and father’s edu-
cation, across birth cohorts. This has several virtues: first, examining educational attainment as
an indicator of socioeconomic status has an advantage over income measured at one point in time
(let alone at the same time for parents and children), as it may be less susceptible to measurement
error, and thus attenuation bias in estimating the degree of status persistence (see, for example,
Zimmerman, 1992). Concerns with using income as a measure of status are especially pronounced
when examining patterns of social mobility across time, as measurement may be more accurate for
recent cohorts. Second, educational attainment is generally fixed by the end of one’s youth (by
age 25 in contemporary China, or at a younger age, when education levels were lower), and so is
very much a reflection of the institutional regime experienced while young. This allows us to link
educational attainment to a particular institutional context, which is far more difficult to do with
earnings (which may be a function of experiences in multiple institutional environments). Relat-
edly, human capital is very difficult, if not impossible, to expropriate (in the absence of slavery). It
thus can function as a metric of social status even during periods of radical change to institutions
and to property rights over physical capital and land, as experienced in 20th century China. Fi-
nally, education data are available for a longer period of time: income data are not available in the
UHS for anyone in the Republican period (the earliest data are final pre-retirement earnings for
individuals who retired in 1964).25 It is also worth noting that we prefer using fathers’ education
as an indicator of parents’ status because women’s access to education varied significantly across
time and space, thus making it a noisier measure of parental status. However, including mother’s
education level as an input in our measure of parents’ status does not affect our results.
In Figure 2, we present the basic patterns of educational status transmission in our data,
showing coefficients on fathers’ educational attainment from a regression of children’s educational
25One might consider using income at the time of retirement as an indicator of status prior to retirement; how-
ever, this exacerbates the problem of measurement error in the explanatory variable and also introduces a wedge—
sometimes across institutional regimes—between economic status when income is measured and economic status at
the time of a child’s birth.
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attainment on fathers’ educational attainment across birth cohorts, between 1930 and 1980.26 We
estimate regressions for five-year moving birth cohort windows; the year plotted is the center of the
five-year interval. In Figure 2, Panel A, we present coefficients from regressions in which we use
education levels as measures of fathers’ and children’s educational attainment. One can see that
among children born prior to 1945, there is generally a large coefficient (typically between 0.2 and
0.3) on fathers’ education: educational attainment is relatively persistent across generations for
these cohorts.27 The coefficients fall among children born in the late 1940s and stay low (around
0.15) until the mid-1960s: that is to say, the cohorts who were educated after the Communist
Party’s takeover of China (and after the first five-year educational plan was implemented in 1953)
experienced a much lower rate of persistence of educational attainment. Next, one can see a rise in
persistence among cohorts born in the late 1960s (and educated in the Reform era), with coefficients
returning to the levels seen in Republican China.
To examine the robustness of this U-shaped pattern of educational persistence across time,
we next replicate the analysis from Panel A, but using an alternative measure of educational
attainment: for children, we use their rank within their five-year birth cohort; fathers’ attainment
is measured as their rank among fathers of children born within the relevant five-year window. One
can see in Figure 2, Panel B, that again, the U-shaped pattern holds. Next, we replicate the analyses
from Panels A and B, but include in the regressions controls for cohort-specific effects of gender,
cohort-specific effects of fathers’ and children’s Communist Party membership status; and quadratic
controls for children’s ages and cohort-specific fathers’ age quadratics. In Figure 2, Panels C and D,
one can see that including these controls in the regressions of children’s educational attainment on
fathers’ attainment does not change the U-shaped pattern of intergenerational persistence across
birth cohorts.28
26Older cohorts are extremely small in our sample; younger cohorts are both small and suffer from the disadvantage
that their educational attainment may not be complete in 2004.
27One can also see a sharp drop in rates of intergenerational educational transmission among children born in the
early- to mid-1930s, with the rate of transmission returning to a high level among children born in the late 1930s.
It is possible that the Second Sino-Japanese War, which began in 1937, disrupted educational attainment for the
mid-1930s birth cohorts and thus interrupted status transmission that would otherwise have occurred. Unfortunately,
we are not able to test this hypothesis with any power, due to the small cell sizes among the oldest birth cohorts in
our sample.
28As an additional robustness check, we produce analogous figures, but using the log years of schooling as our
measure of educational attainment for children and fathers. These can be seen in Appendix Figure A2, and they
again show the U-shaped pattern of status transmission.
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Figure 2: Persistence of educational attainment across cohorts. All panels show coefficients on
fathers’ educational attainment from a regression of children’s educational attainment on fathers’
educational attainment. Regressions are estimated for five-year periods, which “roll” across birth
cohorts (the year plotted is the center of the five-year interval). Panels A and C measure educational
attainment among children and fathers using the level of their years of schooling completed. Panels
B and D measure children’s educational attainment using their rank within the five-year birth-
cohort; fathers’ attainment is measured as their rank among fathers of children born within the
five-year birth cohort. Panels A and B show coefficients estimated from regressions without any
control variables. Panels C and D show coefficients estimated from regressions that include controls
for cohort-specific effects of gender, cohort-specific effects of fathers’ and children’s Communist
Party membership status; and quadratic controls for fathers’ ages and children’s ages (the quadratic
controls for fathers’ ages are also cohort-specific). All regressions estimated using the UHS data
described in the text.
2.3 Regression estimates of social mobility across cohorts
We next present regression estimates of the relationship between fathers’ education and children’s
education, one five-year birth cohort at a time. In our regression analysis, we use three measures of
educational attainment: the first is simply years of schooling, measured for fathers and for children.
Next, to mitigate concerns about changing distributions of education across time distorting our
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comparisons of mobility across cohorts, we also measure educational attainment using children’s
educational rank within their five-year birth cohort, as well as their fathers’ rank among the fathers
of children in that cohort. Finally, for robustness, we also examine the log of fathers’ and children’s
education (these results are reported in the appendix).
Our empirical model is as follows:
educit =
1980∑
t=1930
βt × fathereduci +Xit + δt + ǫit, (1)
where the outcome variable, educit, is the educational attainment measure (levels, logs, or ranks)
of child i born in birth cohort t, where t is the first year of a (fixed, not rolling) five-year cohort
(t ∈ 1930− 1934, . . . 1980− 1984). The explanatory variables of interest are coefficients on fathers’
education (fathereduci), which are estimated by five-year birth cohort (thus, we estimate a full
set of coefficients, βt). We always include a full set of birth cohort dummy variables (δt), and in
some specifications we include controls for cohort-specific effects of gender; cohort-specific effects
of fathers’ and children’s Communist Party membership status; controls for fathers’ and children’s
ages (with fathers’ age controls specific to their children’s birth cohorts); or province×cohort fixed
effects.
In addition to presenting the coefficients on fathers’ education by five-year birth cohort, we
present differences in coefficients, and standard errors of differences, between the coefficients in the
Republican era, the Maoist era, and the Reform era. We assign cohorts born between 1930 and 1944
to the Republican period: these children were too old (9–23 years old) to be very much affected by
the Communist Party’s first five-year education plan (which came into effect in 1953; see Tsang,
2000), especially considering that children born in the 1930s and early 1940s usually completed their
educations at the primary level (see Deng and Treiman, 1997, and Lavely et al., 1990). Children
born between 1945 and 1964 are assigned to the Maoist period: they were 8 years old or younger
at the time of the first CCP education plan, and had also completed at least their lower secondary
schooling prior to the policy reforms of the late 1970s. Finally, children born in 1965 and later
(in practice, 1965 through 1984, given our data constraints) are assigned to the post-Mao, Reform
period: they were 14 or younger at the time the economic reforms were initiated, meaning all of
them would have reached secondary school age during the Reform era (birth cohorts from the late
16
1960s on typically completed their educations at the lower- or upper-secondary level).29
In Table 3, column 1, we present estimates from a specification using children’s and fathers’
education levels (years of schooling completed) as measures of their educational attainment, with-
out including any controls (other than the cohort fixed effects). In the top panel, one can see
that the regression coefficients on five-year birth cohorts for children educated in the Republican
period are generally larger than those for cohorts educated in the Maoist period; then, coefficients
increase again among the youngest cohorts educated in the Reform era. In Table 3, column 2,
we estimate the same specification as in column 1, but add controls for cohort-specific effects of
gender, cohort-specific effects of fathers’ and children’s Communist Party membership status; and
quadratic controls for fathers’ ages and children’s ages. In the top panel, one can see that the
basic patterns across five-year birth cohorts are unchanged from column 1: educational persistence
was relatively high in the Republican era, decreased in the Maoist era, and increased again in the
Reform era.
The evidence in the bottom panel of Table 3, columns 1–2, indicates that social mobility sta-
tistically significantly differed across institutional regimes in 20th century China. The Republican
coefficients exceed those in the Maoist era by around 0.10, with a standard error around 0.05;
the coefficients in the Reform era exceed those in the Maoist era again by around 0.10, with a
standard error of 0.02. It is also important to note that finding significantly larger coefficients for
the Republican period than for the Maoist period suggests that the larger coefficients found for
the Reform era (compared to the Maoist era) are likely not due to measurement error producing
attenuation bias for the older cohorts. One would expect such measurement error to be greater for
the Republican era, yet coefficients are actually larger among older cohorts.
The additional impact of a year of fathers’ schooling in the Republican and Reform eras (relative
to the Maoist era) is also economically meaningful. The predicted difference in education between
children with high school-educated and college-educated fathers (or, equivalently, between children
whose fathers differ by 4 years of secondary schooling30) is 0.6 years in the Maoist era; this difference
jumps to nearly a full year in the Republican and Reform eras. The additional 0.4 years of children’s
29The assignment of the transition cohorts between regimes is necessarily somewhat “fuzzy”. Importantly, our
results are robust to changes in the coding of the transitional cohorts (for example, dropping the 1940–1944 cohort
or the 1965–1969 cohort from our comparisons).
30Four years of education is approximately 1 standard deviation of fathers’ schooling.
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Table 3: Intergenerational Persistence By Five-Year Birth Cohort: Education Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1930 X Father Education Level 0.188 0.239 0.193 0.235 0.303 0.555
(0.131) (0.112) (0.118) (0.117) (0.099) (0.174)
1935 X Father Education Level 0.275 0.273 0.226 0.268 0.299 0.310
(0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.213)
1940 X Father Education Level 0.254 0.244 0.231 0.204 0.286 0.158
(0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.070)
1945 X Father Education Level 0.190 0.193 0.165 0.162 0.198 0.177
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.032)
1950 X Father Education Level 0.116 0.110 0.097 0.099 0.107 0.118
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
1955 X Father Education Level 0.135 0.129 0.117 0.120 0.134 0.124
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018)
1960 X Father Education Level 0.150 0.132 0.127 0.122 0.112 0.165
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004)
1965 X Father Education Level 0.216 0.197 0.193 0.189 0.230 0.169
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.018)
1970 X Father Education Level 0.216 0.186 0.184 0.172 0.187 0.189
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.027)
1975 X Father Education Level 0.254 0.222 0.215 0.190 0.216 0.235
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.038) (0.013)
1980 X Father Education Level 0.313 0.367 0.389 0.327 0.281 0.381
(0.050) (0.076) (0.065) (0.087) (0.047) (0.095)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov X Cohort FE No No Yes No No No
Extended Controls No No No Yes No No
Sample All All All All Non-Native Fathers Native Fathers
Observations 16422 16277 16277 16277 9288 6989
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.077 0.111 0.090 0.110 0.159 0.195
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.047 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.037 0.095
Post-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.088 0.102 0.119 0.094 0.091 0.098
Post-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.019 0.027
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.069 0.090 0.070 0.094 0.141 0.170
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.048 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.038 0.096
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.080 0.081 0.099 0.078 0.074 0.073
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.026 0.021 0.030
Standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses. Pre-Mao five-year birth cohorts begin in 1930, 1935, and 1940. Post-
Mao cohorts begin in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. “Mao (No CR)” excludes the five-year cohorts severely exposed to the
Cultural Revolution, namely 1950 and 1955. Baseline controls are quadratic polynomials in own and father age (the latter
cohort-specific), as well as cohort specific interactions with gender and father and child Communist Party membership.
Extended controls are cohort-specific effects of the following: (i) living in a coastal province and (ii) fathers’ sector of
employment (public or private).
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schooling is substantial, relative to the variation in children’s schooling we observe (the standard
deviation of children’s schooling is 3 years), and relative to the urban-rural gap in schooling (2
years, on average, in the CHARLS dataset).
We next examine the importance of the cohorts affected by the Cultural Revolution in generating
the greater social mobility we find for the cohorts educated in the Maoist period. The bottom panel
of Table 3 (in rows labeled “No CR”) shows differences in coefficients across institutional regimes,
but excluding from the Maoist period those individuals born between 1950 and 1959, who were most
affected by the disruption to education caused by the Cultural Revolution. One can see in Table 3,
columns 1–2, that the differences across regimes fall slightly, but remain quite large, suggesting
that the cohorts most affected by the Cultural Revolution indeed experienced the highest mobility
across generations, though the broader finding of low status persistence during the Maoist era is
not simply a product of the Cultural Revolution.
An important question about these patterns is to what extent are they driven by differential
economic development across Chinese provinces. In Table 3, column 3, we add province×cohort
fixed effects to the specification in column 2. Adding these controls means that we estimate the
persistence of educational attainment exploiting only the within-province, within-cohort variation
in fathers’ educational attainment. These controls allow us to account for changes in educational
attainment that occurred over time, at different rates in different provinces. Again, the broad
pattern seen in other specifications holds: social mobility was relatively low in the Republican
period, increased in the Maoist period, and then fell again in the Reform period.
Fathers’ educational attainment is one dimension of household status, but others available in the
UHS include Communist Party membership (for which we already controlled in columns 2 and 3),
the region of China where one lives (coastal or inland), and the sector of fathers’ employment (public
or private).31 Each of these dimensions might, indeed, have a different impact on a child’s outcomes
for different cohorts of children. To the extent that these measures of status are all correlated with
fathers’ education (but perhaps differentially so across regimes), and that the returns to differing
status dimensions changed over time, one might be concerned that variation in the status persistence
coefficients we observed thus far actually reflects differing omitted variables biases across regimes,
31The UHS also has information about fathers’ incomes, but this is very limited for the pre-Mao birth cohorts. We
examine transmission of status measured by income for the Mao-era and post-Mao cohorts in Table 8, below.
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rather than changes in status transmission.32 To determine whether differences in the effects of
other status dimensions drive our results, in Table 3, column 4, we control for cohort-specific effects
of the following: (i) living in a coastal province and (ii) fathers’ sector of employment (public or
private). One can see that including these controls does not affect our finding of a U-shaped pattern
of educational status transmission.
One important concern with our analysis thus far is that it pools fathers who were urban natives
with fathers who selected into urban areas. Many rural to urban migrants in China move in order
to pursue educational opportunities (for themselves or for their children), or because of political
factors, such as CCP membership or military service (Wu and Treiman, 2004). Furthermore,
fathers who were urban natives would likely have better established social networks than fathers
who migrated to cities, which might be an additional mechanism linking fathers’ status to children’s
status. One might wish to separately study urban native and non-urban native households to
identify status transmission in contexts in which social networks were likely less important (non-
urban natives) and in which selection into the sample is less of a concern (urban natives). In
Table 3, column 5, we estimate the specification estimated in column 2, but restricting the sample
to children of fathers who are non-urban natives.33 One can see that estimates using only the
children of non-urban natives are qualitatively similar to estimates based on the entire sample—if
anything, the U-shaped pattern of status transmission is even sharper in this sub-sample. Thus,
changing values of family social networks that are associated with educational attainment do not
seem to be driving the variation in educational status transmission across institutional regimes.
Finally, in Table 3, column 6, we estimate the specification estimated in column 2, but restricting
the sample to fathers who are “natives”. One can see that estimates using only urban native fathers
again reveal a significant increase in social mobility during the Maoist era and a significant decrease
in mobility post-Mao. This suggests that selected migration into urban areas does not drive our
findings.
One might also be concerned about selection into the sample for reasons other than internal
migration. A primary issue is emigration from China that was differential by socioeconomic status.
32That is, by failing to control for other dimensions of status directly, the effects of these other status dimensions
would “load on” to the coefficient on fathers’ education; if the omitted variables bias varied across regime, this
would generate variation in the coefficients on fathers’ education across cohorts, but for reasons other than changing
educational status transmission.
33We define an urban native as someone who received their urban hukou by age 2, using information in the UHS.
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The families with the greatest incentives to exit China in the period we study were elite-background
families who fled Communist China (for Taiwan, Hong Kong, or elsewhere). Elite households were
able to sustain their status during the Republican period, but may have anticipated declines in
status for their children under the Communist regime. Thus, there might have been less social
mobility in the Republican period, andmore social mobility in the Maoist period if these individuals
had not emigrated. A second source of sample selection is differential mortality: we select on good
outcomes for older-cohort children in our sample, as household heads born as early as 1930 needed
to survive into their 70s to make it into the UHS sample. Because death would have been most likely
among the poorest individuals from the Republican birth cohorts (who were disproportionately born
into poor households), this source of selection would also suggest that there was even less social
mobility in the Republican period than what we observe.34 Thus, if we were able to eliminate
the selection problem, we believe that the U-shaped pattern of persistence would be even more
pronounced.
To examine the robustness of our findings with respect to our measurement of educational
attainment, we next estimate the specifications from Table 3, but using using the ranks of fathers’
and children’s educational attainment (higher ranks indicating greater educational attainment). In
Table 4, columns 1–6, one can see that our results using ranks are very similar to those found
using levels. Finally, we estimate the six specifications from Table 3, but measuring educational
attainment using the the log years of fathers’ and children’s schooling. One can see in Appendix
Table A2, columns 1–6, that our results using this alternative measure of educational attainment are
similar to those found using levels or ranks: again there is a U-shaped pattern of intergenerational
persistence across cohorts, with different institutional regimes associated with different levels of
social mobility.
As a final exercise, we examine whether the un-representativeness of the UHS sample (compared
to the 2005 Chinese census 1% sample) may play an important role in producing the patterns we
observe. Specifically, we assign each child in the UHS sample to a cell defined by the institutional
regime into which the child was born (pre-Mao, Mao, or post-Mao, as defined above) and by the
34The massive famine associated with the Great Leap Forward certainly led to many deaths in the Maoist era,
and some of these might have been of children from poor backgrounds who would have ended up poor; but our main
results are for urban China, where the mortality consequences of the famine were much less severe, and our results
are not driven by the famine-era birth cohorts of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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Table 4: Intergenerational Persistence By Five-Year Birth Cohort: Education Ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1930 X Father Education Rank 0.189 0.223 0.178 0.218 0.281 0.645
(0.136) (0.116) (0.121) (0.123) (0.105) (0.081)
1935 X Father Education Rank 0.268 0.256 0.206 0.250 0.277 0.296
(0.046) (0.046) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.202)
1940 X Father Education Rank 0.288 0.265 0.254 0.221 0.312 0.145
(0.034) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.117)
1945 X Father Education Rank 0.250 0.250 0.209 0.205 0.254 0.238
(0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.041)
1950 X Father Education Rank 0.164 0.141 0.121 0.123 0.143 0.141
(0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.024)
1955 X Father Education Rank 0.211 0.194 0.173 0.182 0.197 0.196
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.031) (0.028)
1960 X Father Education Rank 0.199 0.172 0.167 0.156 0.144 0.219
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1965 X Father Education Rank 0.277 0.251 0.246 0.241 0.295 0.218
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.033) (0.025)
1970 X Father Education Rank 0.289 0.251 0.248 0.233 0.253 0.255
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.022) (0.034)
1975 X Father Education Rank 0.341 0.302 0.286 0.259 0.280 0.329
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.058) (0.015)
1980 X Father Education Rank 0.389 0.450 0.480 0.397 0.392 0.435
(0.057) (0.093) (0.090) (0.115) (0.079) (0.095)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov X Cohort FE No No Yes No No No
Extended Controls No No No Yes No No
Sample All All All All Non-Native Fathers Native Fathers
Observations 16422 16277 16277 16277 9288 6989
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.042 0.059 0.045 0.063 0.106 0.164
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.050 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.040 0.084
Post-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.118 0.124 0.148 0.116 0.120 0.111
Post-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.032 0.029 0.030
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.024 0.037 0.025 0.049 0.091 0.134
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.050 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.041 0.086
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.100 0.103 0.127 0.102 0.106 0.081
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.019 0.028 0.028 0.034 0.030 0.034
Standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses. Pre-Mao five-year birth cohorts begin in 1930, 1935, and 1940. Post-
Mao cohorts begin in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. “Mao (No CR)” excludes the five-year cohorts severely exposed to the
Cultural Revolution, namely 1950 and 1955. Baseline controls are quadratic polynomials in own and father age (the latter
cohort-specific), as well as cohort specific interactions with gender and father and child Communist Party membership.
Extended controls are cohort-specific effects of the following: (i) living in a coastal province and (ii) fathers’ sector of
employment (public or private).
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child’s educational attainment rank among children born into the same institutional regime (above
median or below median). We then do the same with individuals in the 2005 Chinese census 1%
sample who were born between 1930 and 1984 and who have urban hukou status, in the provinces
included in the UHS data. We then calculate the ratio of each cell’s proportion of the census to the
cell’s proportion in the UHS sample. This ratio provides weights that we can apply to adjust the
composition of the UHS sample to match the census: cells with larger weights are under-represented
in the UHS sample relative to the census, and we thus assign greater weight to observations in these
cells in our analysis.
In Table 5, we present regression results from specifications measuring educational attainment
using both levels and ranks, including our baseline control variables (i.e., the specifications in
Table 3, column 2, and Table 4, column 2), but using the re-weighted UHS data. One can see that
re-weighting the UHS sample does not qualitatively affect our results: estimated status persistence
remains markedly higher in the pre-Mao and post-Mao eras than in the Maoist era.
2.4 Transition matrices across institutional regimes
In presenting patterns of social mobility, we have treated the persistence of educational attainment
from one generation to the next as a single parameter that applies uniformly across individuals. Of
course, intergenerational transmission may not be so simple: patterns of social mobility may differ
depending on children’s starting positions. While relatively small cell sizes prevent us from precisely
identifying differences in mobility across the distribution of fathers’ educational attainment, and
across time, we examine changes in intergenerational transition matrices across institutional regimes
to provide suggestive evidence on where in the distribution the changes in mobility observed above
occurred.
To do so, we estimate ordered probit models predicting the quintile of a child’s educational rank
(within a five-year birth cohort), with the explanatory variables of interest being quintiles of fathers’
education ranks interacted with children’s five-year birth cohorts (analogous to our OLS regressions
above, but with five discrete outcomes, and fathers’ ranks converted to quintiles). We use these
estimates to generate five-by-five cell transition matrices showing the distribution of children’s
quintiles as a function of fathers’ quintiles. We generate tables specific to each institutional regime
by averaging across five-year cohort interaction terms in the Republican, Maoist, and Reform
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Table 5: Intergenerational Persistence By Five-Year Birth Cohort: Education
Levels and Ranks Using Re-weighted Data
Education measured in years Education measured as a rank
1930 X Father Educ. Level 0.244 1930 X Father Educ. Rank 0.225
(0.109) (0.123)
1935 X Father Educ. Level 0.224 1935 X Father Educ. Rank 0.214
(0.047) (0.052)
1940 X Father Educ. Level 0.214 1940 X Father Educ. Rank 0.249
(0.018) (0.024)
1945 X Father Educ. Level 0.186 1945 X Father Educ. Rank 0.244
(0.016) (0.013)
1950 X Father Educ. Level 0.111 1950 X Father Educ. Rank 0.146
(0.006) (0.005)
1955 X Father Educ. Level 0.129 1955 X Father Educ. Rank 0.196
(0.014) (0.023)
1960 X Father Educ. Level 0.126 1960 X Father Educ. Rank 0.163
(0.008) (0.013)
1965 X Father Educ. Level 0.138 1965 X Father Educ. Rank 0.177
(0.015) (0.021)
1970 X Father Educ. Level 0.121 1970 X Father Educ. Rank 0.160
(0.009) (0.009)
1975 X Father Educ. Level 0.156 1975 X Father Educ. Rank 0.221
(0.017) (0.026)
1980 X Father Educ. Level 0.353 1980 X Father Educ. Rank 0.393
(0.037) (0.062)
Observations 16277 16277
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.089 0.042
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.041 0.046
Post-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.054 0.051
Post-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.013 0.019
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.071 0.026
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.041 0.046
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.036 0.034
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.014 0.020
Standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses. Pre-Mao five-year birth cohorts begin in
1930, 1935, and 1940. Post-Mao cohorts begin in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. “Mao (No CR)”
excludes the five-year cohorts severely exposed to the Cultural Revolution, namely 1950 and
1955. Both regressions include cohort fixed effects and baseline controls: quadratic polynomials
in own and father age (the latter cohort-specific), as well as cohort specific interactions with
gender and father and child Communist Party membership. Both regressions estimated using
UHS data re-weighted to match the 2005 Chinese census 1% sample as follows: observations in
the UHS sample are assigned to a cell defined by the institutional regime into which the child was
born (pre-Mao, Mao, or post-Mao, as defined above) and by the child’s educational attainment
rank among children born into the same institutional regime (above median or below median).
Individuals in the 2005 Chinese census who were born between 1930 and 1984 and who have
urban hukou status, in the provinces included in the UHS data, are assigned to the same cells.
Weights are calculated as the ratio of each cell’s proportion of the census to the cell’s proportion
in the UHS sample.
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eras—these three transition matrices can be seen in Table 6.
The table suggests that changes in status transmission among the highest-education fathers
appear to be an important part of the changes in social mobility observed above. Comparing
the Pre-Mao (Republican) era transition matrix to the Maoist era matrix, one can see that the
likelihood of a child being in the “(5, 5)” cell (highest education quintile father, highest education
quintile child) is smaller by more than 5 percentage points in the Maoist era than the Republican
era. The children of top-quintile fathers are generally more likely to be lower in the rank distribution
in the Maoist era than in the Republican era. One can see this change reversed in a comparison of
the Maoist and Reform era matrices: in the Reform era, the fraction of children in the “(5,5)” cell
is nearly 3 percentage points greater than in the Maoist era. Top-quintile fathers in general were
more likely to have top quintile children in the Reform era than in the Maoist era.
One also sees greater mobility among children born to bottom-quintile fathers in the Maoist
era. Children born to first quintile fathers are less likely to be in the first quintile themselves in
the Maoist period compared to both the Republican and Reform eras. In contrast, children born
to fathers in the top 4 quintiles are more likely to be in the bottom quintile during the Maoist
era than the Republican and Reform eras. Thus, both increased upward mobility from the bottom
quintile and increased downward mobility from the top quintile appear to play a role in the greater
social mobility we observe in the Maoist era.
2.5 Social mobility in rural China
It is of interest to know whether the U-shaped pattern of persistence observed among urban Chinese
is also present among rural Chinese. While no dataset that we know of includes information on
fathers’ and children’s schooling for birth cohorts of rural Chinese spanning the three institutional
regimes covered by the UHS data, we can turn to multiple datasets which together provide evidence
on social mobility across the 1930–1985 birth cohorts in rural China.
We begin with data taken from Hertz et al. (2007), originally from the World Bank’s (1995) Liv-
ing Standards Measurement Surveys. The dataset allows one to estimate the relationship between
fathers’ and children’s education for rural Chinese in birth cohorts between the 1930s and 1970s;
that is, covering the Republican era and the Maoist one, but not including much data on cohorts
educated following the post-1979 reforms. We complement the Hertz et al. (2007) data with data
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Table 6: Predicted Transition Probabilities By Regime
Children’s Quintile in Pre-Mao Period
1 2 3 4 5
Father’s Quintile 1
Mean 0.375 0.232 0.164 0.134 0.095
Std. Dev 0.030 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.014
Father’s Quintile 2
Mean 0.285 0.222 0.179 0.167 0.147
Std. Dev 0.049 0.006 0.008 0.018 0.029
Father’s Quintile 3
Mean 0.229 0.210 0.185 0.188 0.188
Std. Dev 0.024 0.007 0.001 0.009 0.021
Father’s Quintile 4
Mean 0.200 0.199 0.185 0.198 0.218
Std. Dev 0.035 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.036
Father’s Quintile 5
Mean 0.131 0.166 0.178 0.218 0.307
Std. Dev 0.020 0.013 0.006 0.004 0.035
Children’s Quintile in Mao Period
1 2 3 4 5
Father’s Quintile 1
Mean 0.361 0.231 0.167 0.139 0.102
Std. Dev 0.037 0.001 0.008 0.013 0.017
Father’s Quintile 2
Mean 0.322 0.227 0.174 0.154 0.124
Std. Dev 0.047 0.005 0.008 0.017 0.027
Father’s Quintile 3
Mean 0.275 0.221 0.181 0.171 0.152
Std. Dev 0.031 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.022
Father’s Quintile 4
Mean 0.238 0.213 0.185 0.185 0.180
Std. Dev 0.021 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.017
Father’s Quintile 5
Mean 0.167 0.186 0.184 0.209 0.254
Std. Dev 0.018 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.025
Children’s Quintile in Post-Mao Period
1 2 3 4 5
Father’s Quintile 1
Mean 0.391 0.232 0.161 0.129 0.088
Std. Dev 0.016 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006
Father’s Quintile 2
Mean 0.316 0.228 0.176 0.155 0.125
Std. Dev 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.007
Father’s Quintile 3
Mean 0.273 0.221 0.181 0.171 0.154
Std. Dev 0.033 0.008 0.003 0.012 0.026
Father’s Quintile 4
Mean 0.202 0.201 0.186 0.197 0.213
Std. Dev 0.018 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.019
Father’s Quintile 5
Mean 0.146 0.175 0.181 0.215 0.282
Std. Dev 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.028
Table shows transitions across generations from a particular quintile in the distribution of educational ranks (among fathers)
to a particular quintile in the distribution of educational ranks among children. To generate a transition matrix for each
institutional regime, we estimate ordered probit models predicting the quintile of a child’s educational rank (within a five-year
birth cohort), with the explanatory variables of interest being quintiles of fathers’ education ranks interacted with children’s
five-year birth cohorts. We generate tables specific to each institutional regime by averaging across five-year cohort interaction
terms in the Republican (born 1930–1944), Maoist (born 1945–1964), and Reform (born 1965–1984) eras.
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from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), collected in 2011–2012.
The dataset comes from a survey of households with members aged 45 years or above; we examine
information on fathers’ and children’s education for rural Chinese in birth cohorts between 1940
through the 1980s.35 Together the two datasets span the birth cohorts included in the UHS data.
For the two rural datasets, we regress children’s educational levels on fathers’ educational levels,
running separate regressions for each ten-year birth cohort, and we plot the coefficients on fathers’
education for each ten-year cohort (we plot the first year of a ten-year birth cohort, so the 1960
datapoint represents cohorts born between 1960 and 1969, inclusive). This specification was chosen
as it most closely matched the structure of the Hertz et al. (2007) data while allowing for large
enough cells on which to estimate the regressions. One can see in Figure 3 that the Hertz. et al.
(2007) data show an almost continuous decline in intergenerational persistence from the 1920–1929
cohort through the 1960–1969 cohort. There is a small uptick in the 1970–1979 cohort. Examining
the CHARLS data, one sees a low, but increasing rate of intergenerational persistence for the 1940–
1949 cohort through the 1960–1969 cohort, then a marked jump to very high levels of persistence
for the cohorts born after 1970. We also plot the same specification using our UHS data, for the
cohorts born between 1930 and 1985.36
Examining Figure 3, one can see that the U-shaped pattern of status transmission across time
observed in urban China also seems to hold in rural China: the Hertz et al. (2007) data reveal
a decline in intergenerational persistence (increase in mobility) from the Republican era to the
Maoist era. The CHARLS data show a striking increase in persistence (decline in mobility) from
the pre-Reform to the Reform period. The pattern of social mobility across time in rural China
closely resembles that for urban China.37 Thus, changes in social mobility in urban China were not
35The CHARLS dataset includes both urban and rural Chinese. Patterns of social mobility for the urban Chinese
in the CHARLS sample match those in the UHS for the Maoist and Reform eras (results available from the authors
upon request).
36This is implicitly another robustness exercise for the urban China sample, as we now use decade-by-decade
variation in the impact of fathers’ educational attainment on children’s educational attainment, rather than examine
five-year cohorts. One can see that the U-shaped pattern is present using this specification as well.
37One exception is the increase in status persistence between the 1940s and 1950s birth cohorts in rural areas, in
contrast with the fall in persistence between these cohorts in urban areas. There are several possible explanations for
this difference. A first possibility is differences in “treatment”: rural and urban China experienced the Second Sino-
Japanese War (World War II) and the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) very differently. The economic disruptions
and institutional changes resulting from conflict and the Chinese Communist Party’s victory may have produced
different patterns of status transmission between rural and urban areas among children born in these decades (e.g.,
increased social mobility in rural areas where the CCP was in power as early as the 1940s, and then very high mobility
specifically in urban areas once the CCP took power in the 1950s). A second possibility is that the difference is due
to “selection”: internal migration and emigration from China may have differentially affected rural and urban China,
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Figure 3: Social mobility in urban and rural China. The graph shows coefficients on fathers’ edu-
cation levels from a regression of children’s education levels on fathers’ education levels, estimated
decade by decade. Two rural datasets are used: the CHARLS rural subsample and the World
Bank’s LSMS data used in Hertz et al. (2007). We estimate the same specification using the
(urban) UHS dataset.
offset by different patterns of social mobility in rural China. It is also worth noting that although
rural to urban migration is an important mechanism of social mobility in China, Wu and Treiman
(2004), page 381, describe a “tightening of the hukou system after the Great Leap Forward and
subsequent maintenance of a very low rate of [rural to urban] hukou conversion through 1996.”
Thus, changes in patterns of rural to urban migration likely did not undo the U-shaped pattern of
persistence we observe in both urban and rural China.
particularly during the chaotic 1940s and 1950s (this may produce estimated levels of status transmission in the 1940s
that are “too low” in rural areas).
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2.6 The returns to schooling across institutional regimes
An important assumption underlying our analysis is that education is a good proxy for socioe-
conomic status across the entire time period we study. One might be especially concerned that
higher education levels in fact did not confer higher status during the Maoist period of analysis.
However, while very high levels of education (and “intellectual” status) were problematic during
the time of the Cultural Revolution, more generally, qualitative evidence suggests that higher lev-
els of education were associated with higher status in Communist China—the entrenchment of a
Communist educated elite was precisely Mao’s concern during the Cultural Revolution (see, for
example, Deng and Treiman, 1997, and Andreas, 2009). To provide some quantitative evidence on
the link between education and economic outcomes across the time period we study, we estimate
the relationship between years of schooling and income for the Republican era, the Maoist era, and
the Reform era, respectively.
To study the relationship between education and income in the Republican era, we turn to the
1929 employee records of the Tianjin-Pukou (JinPu) Railroad, a rare early source of individual-level
data on both earnings and educational attainment (see Yuchtman, 2014). The employee records
include information on the school attended, which is converted into years of schooling by assigning
primary/middle schools a level of 7 years completed; assigning high school 12 years; and, assigning
university 16 years.
We use the UHS data to estimate the returns to schooling for individuals who were in the
labor force during the Maoist and Reform eras. As noted above, in addition to asking about
incomes at the time of the survey (2004), the UHS includes data on the final pre-retirement salary
earned by an individual, which provides information on earnings in different years. While the UHS
dataset lacks individuals retiring prior to the Communist takeover, we can estimate the correlation
between education and final income for cohorts retiring during the Maoist and post-1979 Reform
eras. We can also exploit cross-sectional information on incomes in 2004 to estimate the returns to
schooling in the post-Mao era using “current” income (as opposed to final pre-retirement income)
for individuals who are currently in the workforce.
In Table 7, we present estimates of the returns to a year of schooling, for each of the three
periods we study: Republican China, the Maoist period, and the Reform period. We examine the
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returns to schooling only among men to match the composition of the JinPu data and to avoid
concerns about changes in women’s labor market experiences across this long time period. In
column 1, we use the sample of JinPu Railroad workers, and regress “current” (in 1929) log salary
on years of schooling, controlling for age and age-squared. One can see that the return to a year
of schooling is estimated to be around 9%, and is highly statistically significant. In column 2, we
examine individuals in the UHS sample who retired between 1964 (the earliest retirement we have)
and 1979, regressing the log of their final salary on their years of schooling (again, controlling for
age and age-squared, as well as an interaction between individuals’ retirement year and an age
quadratic). We find that the return to a year of schooling in the Maoist era was around 4%, and
highly statistically significant.38
Particularly after the Communist takeover in 1949, one might wonder if the returns to education
we observe reflect returns to CCP membership, which might be positively correlated with education.
We thus estimate the same specification as column 2, but including a CCP member dummy as a
control. In Table 7, column 3, one can see that Communist Party membership is associated with
higher pre-retirement earnings in the Maoist era, but it does not drive the positive returns to
schooling. In fact, the coefficient on schooling is unchanged when we include the CCP member
control.
In Table 7, column 4, we estimate the same specification as column 2, but using the final
incomes of individuals in the UHS sample who retired between 1980 and 2004. One can see that
the estimated return to a year of schooling in the Reform period is again around 4% and highly
significant. In column 5, we add the CCP member dummy to the specification in column 4,
and we continue to find a significant, positive return to schooling. Finally, in columns 6 and 7,
we estimate the specifications in columns 4 and 5, but using the current income of individuals
in the UHS sample working in 2004 (and excluding the retirement year interactions). We find
returns to schooling of around 8–9% in these specifications. Thus, across institutional regimes,
we find a significant association between education and income. Importantly, while Communist
Party membership is associated with higher earnings, it does not account for the higher earnings
38Note that this estimate is not directly comparable to the Republican period estimate because, in addition to
coming from a very different sample, the measure of income is the final preretirement income, rather than “current”
income in an arbitrary year. Because retirement is an endogenous choice, final income may be a worse proxy for
lifetime earnings than “current” income.
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of individuals with greater educational attainment.
2.7 Alternative measures of status
The evidence in Table 7 suggests that education was positively associated with socioeconomic status
across the time period we study. We next explore variation in the transmission of other dimensions
of status across regimes. Here we examine status transmission using income and CCP membership
as indicators of fathers’ and children’s social status. Both are plausible indicators of status in 20th
century China, though examination of both measures is limited by the available data.
We begin by examining patterns of status transmission using income as an indicator of fathers’
and children’s socioeconomic status. We measure children’s status using the rank of their current
income or their final pre-retirement salary within their five-year birth cohort.39 We analogously
measure fathers’ status using the rank of their current income or their final pre-retirement salary
among fathers of children born within a five-year birth cohort. Because our income measures are
only from the 1964–2004 period, we examine status transmission from fathers to children only
among the children born in the Maoist (1945–1964) and Reform (1965–1984) eras. As noted above,
one might use income at the time of retirement as an indicator of status prior to retirement for earlier
birth cohorts. However, the gap between a father’s earnings at retirement and earnings at the time
of a child’s birth exacerbates the problem of measurement error in the explanatory variable. This
gap may also span across multiple institutional regimes, making it even more difficult to properly
measure economic status at the time of a child’s birth.
In Table 8, column 1, we show the era-specific (Maoist or Reform) coefficient on fathers’ income
rank (higher “rank” indicates a higher income) from a regression of children’s status (also measured
using income) on an interaction between fathers’ status and a Maoist cohort dummy, an interaction
between fathers’ status and a Reform cohort dummy, and cohort fixed effects. One can see that
there is a significant, positive coefficient on fathers’ status in each period, and that the coefficient on
fathers’ status increases by 50% in the Reform era, consistent with our finding of greater persistence
of status in the Reform era when we used educational attainment as an indicator of fathers’ and
children’s status. In the bottom panel of the table, we show the difference between the two eras’
39If both final salary and income are available, we average the two ranks. Results are very similar using either one
of the two income variables alone.
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coefficients and the standard error of the difference. In Table 8, column 2, we add quadratic
controls for both fathers’ and children’s ages (the fathers’ age quadratic is cohort-specific) and
cohort-specific gender effects, and results are practically unchanged.
We next show analogous regressions using CCP membership as an indicator of fathers’ and
children’s socioeconomic status. In our analysis of status transmission using CCP membership as
an indicator of status, we again focus on children born in the Maoist and Reform eras.40 In Table 8,
column 3, one can see that there is a significant, positive coefficient on fathers’ CCP membership
status in each period, but there is no increase in status transmission in the Reform era, when
status is measured by CCP membership (indeed, there is a slight decline in the coefficient on
fathers’ status). In column 4, we add controls, and again find a positive coefficient on fathers’ CCP
membership status in both periods, with a decline in the coefficient on fathers’ CCP membership
status in the Reform era. While the findings in columns 3 and 4 might indicate a less significant
role of parents’ CCP membership status in determining children’s CCP status, the difference in
coefficients might also be a product of data limitations: children in the youngest cohorts in our
dataset may yet attain CCP status (and whether they do so may be a function of their parents’
status), so the rate of status transmission for younger cohorts might change as they age.
For comparison, in Table 8, columns 5 and 6, we estimate the same specifications as columns
1 and 2 (and 3 and 4), but using the rank of educational attainment as the indicator of children’s
and fathers’ status (as we did above). These estimates both serve as a comparison for the other
two measures of status, and serve as yet another robustness exercise for our primary results. One
can see that we again find a significant increase in educational status transmission in the post-Mao
Reform era using this specification; interestingly, the magnitudes of the coefficients on fathers’
education rank are very similar to those when we examine fathers’ income rank.
Observing significant status transmission along the income, CCP membership, and educational
attainment dimensions in both Mao-era and post-Mao China—and observing that income transmis-
sion seems to have increased across regimes alongside educational status transmission, while CCP
40Children born in the Republican era to fathers who eventually became members of the Communist Party may
have been born to fathers who were CCP members during the Republican era (in which case their fathers’ status at
the time of their birth may not have been especially high) or they may have been born to fathers who eventually
became CCP members long after their children’s births (in which case their fathers’ status at the time of their birth
is unclear). The wedge between a parent’s CCP membership in our dataset, and their status at the time a child was
raised may result in severe measurement error, especially when comparing across institutional regimes.
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membership transmission did not—raises interesting questions about the relationships among these
dimensions of status (as well as other dimensions). In particular, it is natural to wonder whether
our baseline finding of changing educational status transmission across regimes reflects changing
intergenerational correlations of characteristics that are correlated with educational attainment
(other dimensions of status, household characteristics, etc.).
In our discussion of Tables 3 and 4, we raised the possibility that household characteristics were
differentially correlated with educational attainment across cohorts, or were differentially transmit-
ted across generations, which might distort our estimates of intergenerational status transmission.
We found, however, that controlling for cohort-varying effects of fathers’ CCP membership, living
in a coastal province, and fathers’ sector of employment (public or private) did not affect our find-
ing of a U-shaped pattern of educational status transmission. We then considered the possibility
that fathers’ social networks affected children’s status—perhaps differentially across institutional
regimes. However, we found similar results for fathers who were urban natives (and likely had
well-established social networks) and non-urban natives.
We next examine the effects of controlling directly for fathers’ and children’s incomes and CCP
membership on the relationship between fathers’ and children’s educational attainment. If our
baseline results (e.g., Table 8, columns 5 and 6) were driven by changes in the intergenerational
correlations of these other measures of status, then controlling for them should have a noticeable
effect on the coefficients on fathers’ educational attainment. In Table 8, column 7, one can see that
the coefficients on fathers’ educational attainment fall for both the Maoist era and the post-Mao
era, when we control for fathers’ and children’s CCP membership and income (though they remain
highly statistically significant). This is what one would expect given that educational attainment is
a proxy for social status, which is positively correlated with income. Importantly, however, one can
see in the bottom panel of Table 8 that the difference in educational status transmission coefficients
across regimes is almost unchanged when we control for the alternative dimensions of status. The
difference between Mao-era and post-Mao intergenerational transmission of educational attainment
does not seem to be driven by changes in the intergenerational correlations of CCP membership or
income.
We next examine the effects of other household characteristics, controlling for regime-varying
effects of mothers’ education rank and children’s sector of employment (public or private), as well
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as cohort-varying effects of fathers’ sector and of children’s region (coastal or non-coastal province).
One can see in Table 8, column 8, that there is again a decrease in the coefficients on fathers’ educa-
tional attainment for both the Maoist era and the post-Mao era, and the difference in transmission
of fathers’ educational status across regimes also falls, from 0.077 to 0.043. However, examining
the coefficients on mothers’ education, one can see that there was an increase in mothers’ educa-
tional status transmission across regimes of 0.032; thus, the sums of the coefficients on mothers’
and fathers’ education show a difference in educational status transmission across regimes (0.075)
that is quite similar to what was observed in Table 8, columns 5–7.41 These findings suggest that
educational attainment per se is a robust component of the changes in intergenerational status
transmission we observe across regimes.
3 Discussion: educational policies and politics
A broad range of policies varied across the institutional regimes we study and might have affected
the intergenerational transmission of educational status: changes in the distribution of wealth and
income; changes in health care and other social services; and, changes in the labor market all
play an important role in shaping the preferences and constraints of households making human
capital investment decisions.42 While we cannot identify the causal effects of specific policies (or
of other time-varying changes) that produced the U-shaped pattern of status persistence observed
above, we explore one plausible mechanism: the provision of schooling by the state. Educational
expansion has historically played a role in reducing economic inequality (Goldin and Katz, 1994,
2008), and, indeed, the Communist Party made notable efforts to expand school enrollments and
literacy around the time we observe social mobility increasing (Tsang, 2000).
We examine the relationship between social mobility and the expansion of education in Figure 4.
We first plot the pattern of educational persistence in the UHS sample, five-year cohort by five-
41We examine whether there are significant changes in assortative mating (i.e., stronger correlations between fathers’
and mothers’ educations) between the Mao and the post-Mao era, but do not find a significant difference. Another
possibility, as noted above, is that unobservables (ability) were differentially correlated with educational attainment
in different institutional regimes. However, if anything, it seems likely that the unobservables of the high education
parents in the post-Mao regime were worse than one might expect, due to the non-meritocratic expansion of schooling
in the Maoist era (in which most post-Mao parents were educated).
42See Zhou (2004) for a detailed discussion of social and economic policies in urban China since the Communist
revolution.
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year cohort, converting the coefficients into an index equal to 100 in 1940.43 The pattern is the
familiar U-shape, seen in Figure 2. Alongside the pattern of status transmission, we show an index
(again, 1940=100) of average educational attainment for each five-year birth cohort in our UHS
sample. One can see in Figure 4 that the relationship between increased educational attainment
and social mobility is far from simple. On the one hand, educational attainment certainly increased
from the Republican era into the Maoist era, as social mobility increased. But on the other hand,
educational attainment continued to increase into the Reform era as social mobility fell (the slight
decline in educational attainment among the 1980–1984 birth cohort is a result of the youngest
cohorts having incomplete educational attainment in the year of the UHS survey, 2004).
We also show in Figure 4 another series: the Gini coefficient for educational attainment by
five-year birth cohort in the UHS sample (again converted into an index). The pattern of the Gini
suggests that while average education levels increased during both the Maoist and Reform eras, the
two expansions had differing effects on the equality of education levels across individuals within a
cohort. The Maoist educational expansion saw the Gini index fall from a peak over 120 to around
70 in the 1960–1964 birth cohort. Beginning with the 1965 cohort, however, although average
educational attainment continued to rise steadily, the Gini fell only slightly, from 70 to 60 (and the
Gini for the 1980–1984 cohort is likely understated due to incomplete educational attainment in
the youngest cohort in the sample).
These patterns suggest that some educational expansions are much more equalizing than others.
Indeed, an examination of educational policy across regimes shows that the politics of each era
shaped education policies in ways that differentially benefitted different groups.
3.1 Education in Republican China
Chinese education underwent a transition from traditional, Confucian education to modern schools
teaching Western subjects in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Yuchtman, 2014).44 The rise
of modern, Western schools was extremely rapid following the 1905 elimination of the Imperial
43We regress children’s education levels on fathers’ education levels, separately by five-year birth cohorts of children;
then, we divide the coefficients on fathers’ education for each five-year birth cohort by the value of the coefficient for
the 1940–1944 cohort, and multiply by 100.
44The traditional system trained individuals for a series of exams which conferred social status, income, and
positions in the Imperial civil service if passed (see Chang, 1955). While only a small fraction of individuals passed
the civil service exams, a larger group (perhaps a third of men) attained at least basic literacy within the traditional
system (Rawski, 1979).
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Figure 4: Educational attainment, inequality, and status persistence. The graph shows the pattern
of educational persistence across cohorts, from regressions of children’s years of schooling on fathers’
years of schooling (without controls), separately estimated for each five-year birth cohort. It also
shows the average educational attainment by five-year birth cohort, as well as the Gini coefficient
for educational attainment by five-year birth cohort. All series generated using the UHS sample
described in the text.
Exams that were based on the Confucian classics. Yan (2011) shows that the number of students
enrolled in modern schools increased six-fold between 1912 and 1936, from 3 million students to
around 19 million.
While education levels increased, access to tertiary education remained extremely limited: the
number of college students was practically unchanged between 1912 and 1936, remaining at around
40,000, despite an increase in the number of high school students from around 100,000 to 600,000
over the same period. The scarcity of slots at university is reflected in Yan’s estimate of the salary
premiums paid to the highly skilled, which increased dramatically in the 1930s. Yuchtman (2014)
also finds high salary premiums paid by the JinPu railroad in 1929 to individuals with university
training.
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The modern education system in Republican China was designed to produce a Westernized,
but nationalist, elite able to modernize the country. This elite was disproportionately drawn from
wealthy, urban families. Beijing and Shanghai had nearly 40% of all universities and over half of
the most prestigious national public universities. Nearly all of these schools (with the exception
of the Normal Schools) were extremely expensive to attend—living expenses and tuition could run
well over the yearly income of the average urban household (Yeh, 1990).
Yeh (1990), page 5, describes the hierarchy of backgrounds of students in Republican colleges
and universities: “The highest provincial elite with metropolitan connections, along with the com-
mercial and professional elites of major cities, sent their children to colleges and universities in
Beijing and Shanghai, where Western subjects were often stressed along with mathematics and
sciences. The progeny of the intermediate levels of prefectural societies and rural towns—former
members of the lower degree-holding gentry and aspiring landlord households, petty rice brokers
and rentiers, and so forth—attended provincial institutions.”
Thus, Republican China’s education system provided opportunities to the children of the non-
elite up to a point: school enrollments expanded greatly. However, the highest levels of education
remained quite closed, promising extremely high payments to a lucky few, disproportionately drawn
from the landowning classes and the urban wealthy.
3.2 Education in Maoist China
While the Chinese Communist Party was broadly committed to educational expansion after taking
power in 1949, the details of its education policy were the subject of intense internal political
conflict (see, for example, Deng and Treiman, 1997, and Andreas, 2009).45 The debate posed those
on the far left, who stressed political ideology and mass education, against those on the “right”
(still within the Party), who stressed the development of technical expertise and the education of
a meritocratic elite. The left-wing “Red” faction was generally dominant between 1948 and 1976
(our “Maoist” period).
Deng and Treiman (1997) present a detailed discussion of education policy and data on edu-
45As Andreas (2009) documents, the educational system was a key tool for cementing the eventual alliance between
new political elites (the CCP members) and old cultural and economic elites (who tended to control the universities).
This discussion relates to an older Marxist literature analyzing the class structure and internal politics of the socialist
economies (see, for example, Djilas, 1957, and Cliff, 1988).
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cational attainment during the Maoist era. Using the 1982 Chinese census, they show that CCP
efforts to expand schooling for the masses were fruitful. Consistent with our findings, cohorts of
boys educated in the Maoist era had significantly higher levels of education on average, with much
of the increase coming from increased levels of secondary schooling (see Deng and Treiman, 1997,
Figure 2). Lavely et al. (1990) show that education rose (and illiteracy was dramatically reduced)
among girls educated during the Maoist era as well (again, this matches what we find in Figure 4).
Deng and Treiman (1997), page 396, describe policies implemented by the CCP at the primary,
secondary, and tertiary levels specifically aimed at improving access to education among the poor.
Among these were:
[P]olitical measures designed to equalize educational opportunity and reduce the influ-
ence of inheritance [including] affordable primary and secondary education and free ter-
tiary education. The state appropriated all universities and colleges in 1950, abolished
tuition fees, provided subsidies for students, and guaranteed jobs following graduation.
In this way, students were freed from constraints imposed by their ability to pay or their
need to work to help support their families.”
Andreas (2009) provides a vivid account of the changes experienced at Tsinghua University, the
leading science and engineering university in China. In 1952, the Chinese government inaugurated
a national examination system for university admission. In that year, Tsinghua saw only 14% of
its enrollment come from poor (“worker-peasant”) families. The CCP, with the “Red” faction in
control, responded by radically altering admissions criteria for students from disadvantaged back-
grounds. Education was to follow the “mass road” as opposed to the “genius road”; university
slots were reserved for “worker-peasant-soldier students”, often older and with much less prepara-
tion than traditional students. Teachers were encouraged to pay more attention to students who
were having difficulty, rather than those who were star performers. As a result of these policies,
Tsinghua saw significant growth in the enrollment of worker-peasant students, up to nearly one-half
of students in the early 1960s.
The Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966, took the egalitarian “Red” logic to extremes, and
severely politicized and disrupted education. Universities, and schools more generally, became sites
where Red Guards terrorized students, and particularly teachers and professors. One result of the
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period’s social and political conflict was a massive disruption of education in China, with schools
at different levels and in different places interrupted to differing degrees. While primary schools
were able to operate, Deng and Treiman (1997) note that almost all secondary and post-secondary
schools were closed from 1966 through 1968 and most colleges and universities were closed for the
entire 1966 to 1972 period. Even when schools reopened, the education system was badly damaged
by the extreme politicization of education in the early to mid-1970s, with many teachers purged,
urban students “sent down” to work in the countryside, and student selection even more focused
on political qualifications and class background than in the early 1960s (see Deng and Treiman,
1997, p. 400).
Thus, both the pre-Cultural Revolution and Cultural Revolution periods of the Maoist era saw
efforts made to support the schooling of children from poorer backgrounds. Our findings above
suggest that the more mild policies of the early Maoist era produced a significant increase in social
mobility; the social upheaval of the Cultural Revolution then may have led to even more social
mobility among the cohorts most affected by it.
3.3 Education in the Reform era
Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in the years following the end of the Cultural Revolution was asso-
ciated not only with economic liberalization, but also with significant reforms to education, away
from the increasingly “Red” education system in place during the Cultural Revolution, and toward
a system that would train a meritocratic, technical elite. Notably, the gaokao college entrance exam
was re-instated in 1977 as the primary criterion for admission to the universities. Elite primary and
middle schools that had been opened up to villages were now to take students based on performance
on standardized tests.
Alongside the shift toward a test-based system of educational selection and advancement, the
CCP continued to enact policies aimed at expanding educational attainment. Tsang (2000) shows
that government spending on education significantly increased during the Reform era, nearly dou-
bling as a share of government expenditure between the 1950–1978 period and the 1979–1992 period.
The increased spending is reflected in increased educational attainment, as can be seen in Figure 4.
While educational opportunities may have increased for all, it is clear that inequalities in the
Chinese education system (and inequalities in children’s backgrounds), along with test-based ad-
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mission to high schools and universities, meant that improved educational opportunities went dis-
proportionately to the children of the educated elite. Li et al. (2013a) describe how unequal access
to quality education is rooted early in childhood, with poor students “less qualified for academic
high schools . . . [due to] unequal access to high quality kindergartens, primary schools, and junior
high schools, which could help prepare them for competitive entrance exams.” Of course, being
unqualified for an academic high school means university education is out of the question.
In addition to differences in preparation and qualifications among children from differing back-
grounds, specific educational policies in the Reform era have further advantaged the children of
elites. For example, tertiary education funding and admissions quotas vary significantly across
regions, with the richest Chinese cities receiving a disproportionate share of spending and seats.
Figure 5 shows the evolution across the Reform era of an “opportunity index” measuring the avail-
ability of university seats to a province’s students, relative to secondary school enrollments. The
data on university positions and secondary school enrollments are disaggregated by province, with
an “opportunity index” value of 1 indicating that a province has the national average number of
university seats per secondary student (data are taken from Li, 2010b). For simplicity, we present
the values of the index for three rich province-level municipalities (Tianjin, Shanghai, and Beijing),
and the average for the rest of China. One can see that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, students
in the rich municipalities already enjoyed disproportionate access to universities, and this persisted
across time. While the index values for the rich cities have declined somewhat since the mid-1990s,
it is still the case that university slots are disproportionately going to regions that are already
rich—precisely the opposite of the affirmative action programs of the Maoist era.46
Li et al. (2013a), page 22, summarize Chinese educational expansion at the tertiary level as
follows: “even one of the most rapid expansions of college enrollments in history was not, in and of
itself, able to substantially reduce inequality in access.” The Reform era saw education expenditures
and levels expand; however, the primary beneficiaries of these expansions have been the children of
the urban rich, who have access to the best schools, teachers, and test preparation programs from
a young age, and who can thus succeed in exams qualifying them for the best high schools and
46The elite-oriented nature of contemporary Chinese educational policy can be seen in other policy choices as well.
For example, a hierarchy of universities has been established which determines access to government funds, with far
greater funding going to the elite universities. Li (2010a), page 278, describes “The 211 Project [which] was designed
to provide special support to the top 100 universities to help improve their teaching, research, and infrastructure. . . .
[and the] 985 Project [which] is aimed at helping the top forty universities to become world-class universities.”
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Figure 5: Opportunity Index for Three Rich Province-level Municipalities and for Other Provinces.
Graph shows an index of university access—a province’s university seats relative to its number of
secondary students, relative to the national average—for each year, 1980–2002. The index values
for three rich, province-level municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin are shown alongside
the average for the remaining provinces of China. Data from Li (2010b).
universities (where government spending is increasingly concentrated). The consequence of this
system has been a reduction in social mobility alongside greater educational attainment overall.47
4 Conclusion
We have presented evidence that social mobility in China varied significantly across the 20th cen-
tury, with status persistence following a U-shaped pattern that coincides with the institutional
changes experienced in the 20th century: social mobility rose following the Communist takeover of
1949 and then fell to pre-1949 levels in the post-Mao era of economic reforms.
47We also find evidence that the returns to the highest levels of schooling have increased in the post-Mao era:
returns to schooling are convex in the Reform era (and the Republican era), while they are not in the Maoist era (see
Appendix Table A3).
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The sharp drop in status transmission following the Communist revolution contrasts with re-
cent work finding very little change in social mobility rates across time in a variety of settings,
and suggests that social mobility can be affected by radical institutional and policy changes. How-
ever, the rapid return to pre-revolution levels of status transmission in the post-Mao era suggests
a powerful tendency toward a high rate of status transmission—an intergenerational mobility ana-
logue to Michels’ (1949) “Iron Law of Oligarchy”. The reversion to a relatively high rate of status
transmission could derive from a variety of mechanisms—political, economic, sociological, and
genetic—which warrant further study (see also Clark, 2014).
Our findings of a decline in social mobility in the post-Mao era also raise important questions
about the role of competitive, meritocratic educational institutions in generating social mobility,
both historically and today. For centuries, imperial China’s educational system was oriented around
a series of competitive exams, which conferred social status and economic returns (see Chang,
1955, Ho, 1962, and Elman, 2000). These exams also offered a clear path for the upwardly-mobile:
talented students from humble backgrounds could rise to the top of China’s social hierarchy if
they performed exceptionally well on the imperial exams. Contemporary Chinese educational
institutions offer a similar promise of social mobility to students who are able to perform well on
high school and college entrance exams.
However, both historically and today, the promise of upward mobility through a meritocratic
education system has differed from the practice. The very high stakes associated with educational
attainment incentivize incumbent elites to shape policy to the benefit of their children; unequal
endowments allow elites to differentially invest in their children’s educations. Ho (1962) finds that
while the imperial exams did offer the opportunity for upward mobility to some, the descendants
of civil service elites were vastly over-represented among individuals who succeeded on the exams
in the Ming and especially in the Qing Dynasty.48 Our analysis suggests that the return to a
competitive, exam-oriented education system in post-Mao China has been associated with unequal
access to educational institutions and reduced social mobility. Even if social status is conferred on
the basis of meritocratic exams, the children of the elite are typically better positioned (though
48Ho (1962), page 261, writes that the numbers of jinshi elites from humble backgrounds, “were highest at the
beginning of Ming times . . . began to decline drastically in the late sixteenth century, and further dropped to a
stabilized low level of below 20 percent after the late seventeenth century. Other things being equal, members of
successful families naturally had various competitive advantages and must in the long run prevail over the humble
and poor in the competitive examination.”
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better schools, better training, a more supportive home environment) to achieve that merit; in some
cases, competitive, meritocratic educational institutions may not allow for the upward mobility that
is one of their greatest potential virtues.
Our results thus suggest that if the Communist Party wishes to generate greater social mobility,
it will need to do more than establish exams that are meritocratic, but the preparation for which
depends on vastly unequal endowments across households. It will need to reach out to the children
of the poor and pull them into the higher education system despite their disadvantages. It will also
need to confront the politically (and economically) complicated trade-off between investing in its
elite educational institutions, which aim to produce world-class levels of research and innovation,
and investing in less exalted schools in poorer areas, where tertiary education, and even secondary
education, are currently severely lacking. These choices are not unique to contemporary China:
societies across time and space have faced a trade-off between competitive, meritocratic education
designed to develop expertise versus broad schooling that raises the human capital of the lower
part of the distribution.
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Appendix: Additional Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Analy-
sis
In this appendix we present results that complement the main descriptive statistics and empirical
analyses that appear in the main text. We first describe the UHS data in more detail. In the main
text, Table 1, we presented detailed descriptive statistics for children educated under each of the
three institutional regimes we study (as well as for their fathers). We next disaggregate the data
further and present descriptive statistics for children by five-year birth cohort (as well as for their
fathers). In Table A1, one can see the number of children in each five-year cohort as well as their
average schooling levels, their father’s average schooling level, etc.
Next, we provide an additional comparison between the UHS data and the 2005 Chinese census
1% sample to complement the comparisons made in Table 2 in the main text. In Figure A1, we
present the distribution (kernel density) of births by year in (i) the UHS data that we examine, (ii)
the urban population in the Chinese census, and (iii) the urban population in the Chinese census in
the provinces covered by the UHS data. One can see that while much of the variation across cohorts
in the Chinese census is reflected in the UHS sample (e.g., the dip in births in the late 1950s), the
UHS sample somewhat under-represents individuals from the oldest and youngest birth cohorts,
and over-represents individuals born between 1945 and 1975. This un-representativeness (along
with other dimensions along which the UHS and Chinese census differ—see Table 2) motivates
our estimation of our main regression models using re-weighted observations to match the UHS
composition to the Chinese census (see Table 5). Reassuringly, we find that re-weighting the UHS
data (over-weighting observations in age×education cells that are under-represented in the UHS)
does not alter our findings.
We next replicate Figure 2, but using log years of schooling, rather than levels of years of
schooling or educational attainment ranks, as in the main text. We regress children’s log years
of schooling on fathers’ log schooling for “rolling” five-year birth cohort windows, and plot the
coefficient on fathers’ schooling for each five-year window (we estimate models with and without
controls). One can see in Figure A2 that using log years of schooling produces the same U-shaped
pattern of educational status transmission as using education levels or ranks.
We next examine the robustness of our main set of regression estimates (in Table 3) to measuring
educational attainment using log years of schooling, rather than levels of years of schooling or
educational attainment ranks, as in the main text. In Table A2, we estimate the same specifications
as in Table 3, but with the alternative measure of educational attainment for fathers and children.
As one can see, our results are very similar when we use the alternative measure of educational
attainment.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics by Five-year Birth Cohort
Education
CCP
Member
Urban
Native
Father’s Education
Father CCP
Member
Father Urban
Native
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1930-1934 birth cohort
Mean 8.99 0.53 0.43 4.33 0.03 0.11
Std. Dev. 3.91 0.50 0.50 4.11 0.17 0.31
Obs 214 214 214 214 214 214
1935-1939 birth cohort
Mean 9.80 0.45 0.40 4.29 0.10 0.10
Std. Dev. 4.05 0.50 0.49 4.25 0.30 0.31
Obs 405 405 405 405 405 405
1940-1944 birth cohort
Mean 10.01 0.40 0.55 4.57 0.10 0.17
Std. Dev. 3.54 0.49 0.50 4.19 0.30 0.38
Obs 577 577 577 577 577 577
1945-1949 birth cohort
Mean 10.07 0.38 0.61 5.34 0.18 0.25
Std. Dev. 3.19 0.49 0.49 4.48 0.38 0.43
Obs 1141 1140 1141 1141 1141 1141
1950-1954 birth cohort
Mean 10.01 0.36 0.72 5.45 0.27 0.33
Std. Dev. 2.76 0.48 0.45 4.29 0.44 0.47
Obs 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221
1955-1959 birth cohort
Mean 10.73 0.31 0.77 5.77 0.35 0.39
Std. Dev. 2.57 0.46 0.42 4.07 0.48 0.49
Obs 2630 2630 2630 2630 2630 2630
1960-1964 birth cohort
Mean 11.33 0.29 0.76 6.13 0.38 0.46
Std. Dev. 2.76 0.46 0.42 3.77 0.48 0.50
Obs 3404 3399 3404 3404 3404 3404
1965-1969 birth cohort
Mean 11.82 0.26 0.73 6.98 0.37 0.53
Std. Dev. 2.96 0.44 0.44 3.92 0.48 0.50
Obs 2942 2939 2942 2942 2942 2942
1970-1974 birth cohort
Mean 12.29 0.21 0.71 7.86 0.38 0.56
Std. Dev. 2.75 0.41 0.45 3.79 0.48 0.50
Obs 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026
1975-1979 birth cohort
Mean 12.93 0.18 0.72 8.70 0.37 0.61
Std. Dev. 2.73 0.38 0.45 3.64 0.48 0.49
Obs 750 750 750 750 750 750
1980-1984 birth cohort
Mean 12.30 0.05 0.80 8.97 0.21 0.67
Std. Dev. 2.59 0.23 0.40 3.53 0.41 0.47
Obs 112 112 112 112 112 112
All birth cohorts
Mean 11.14 0.30 0.71 6.30 0.32 0.43
Std. Dev. 3.02 0.46 0.45 4.14 0.47 0.49
Obs 16422 16413 16422 16422 16422 16422
Table contains information on children born between 1930 and 1984 in the UHS dataset, as well as on their fathers.
Education is measured in years. CCP membership is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a child (or father) is a CCP member.
Native urban status is defined as receiving urban registration (hukou) by age 2.
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Table A2: Intergenerational Persistence By Five-Year Birth Cohort: Log Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1930 X Log Father Education 0.169 0.263 0.210 0.257 0.302 0.338
(0.075) (0.084) (0.093) (0.086) (0.084) (0.101)
1935 X Log Father Education 0.157 0.171 0.151 0.161 0.178 0.388
(0.015) (0.039) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.183)
1940 X Log Father Education 0.090 0.095 0.083 0.078 0.128 -0.027
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.065)
1945 X Log Father Education 0.078 0.087 0.082 0.067 0.081 0.091
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.033)
1950 X Log Father Education 0.049 0.047 0.040 0.040 0.053 0.041
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
1955 X Log Father Education 0.059 0.055 0.050 0.050 0.062 0.043
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
1960 X Log Father Education 0.068 0.060 0.060 0.052 0.042 0.084
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
1965 X Log Father Education 0.112 0.105 0.104 0.097 0.122 0.091
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
1970 X Log Father Education 0.129 0.114 0.112 0.104 0.116 0.114
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017)
1975 X Log Father Education 0.143 0.124 0.121 0.104 0.138 0.121
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.022) (0.009)
1980 X Log Father Education 0.183 0.215 0.245 0.188 0.230 0.187
(0.078) (0.096) (0.093) (0.089) (0.057) (0.115)
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov X Cohort FE No No Yes No No No
Extended Controls No No No Yes No No
Sample All All All All Non-Native Fathers Native Fathers
Observations 14462 14326 14326 14326 7847 6479
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.075 0.114 0.090 0.113 0.143 0.168
Pre-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.074
Post-Mao - Mao (All) Mean 0.078 0.077 0.087 0.071 0.092 0.063
Post-Mao - Mao (All) SE 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.030
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.066 0.103 0.077 0.106 0.141 0.145
Pre-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.029 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.075
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) Mean 0.069 0.066 0.074 0.063 0.090 0.041
Post-Mao - Mao (No CR) SE 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.033
Standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses. Pre-Mao five-year birth cohorts begin in 1930, 1935, and 1940. Post-
Mao cohorts begin in 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. “Mao (No CR)” excludes the five-year cohorts severely exposed to the
Cultural Revolution, namely 1950 and 1955. Baseline controls are quadratic polynomials in own and father age (the latter
cohort-specific), as well as cohort specific interactions with gender and father and child Communist Party membership.
Extended controls are cohort-specific effects of the following: (i) living in a coastal province and (ii) fathers’ sector of
employment (public or private).
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Figure A1: Cohort density in the UHS sample and in the 2005 Chinese census 1% sample. The UHS
sample includes children born between 1930 and 1984; the census data show 1930–1984 births of
individuals with urban hukou status, and 1930–1984 births of individuals with urban hukou status
in the UHS provinces.
Finally, we examine whether returns to the highest levels of education have changed across the
institutional regimes we study. In Table 7 (in the main text), we presented evidence of significant,
positive returns to schooling in each institutional regime using a log-linear model; we now add a
quadratic term in years of schooling to test for a non-linear return to education. In Table A3,
one can see that the coefficient on Years of Schooling2 is positive and significant in the pre-Mao
era, is negative in the Mao era, and positive again in the post-Mao era (statistical significance
varies depending on the income measure used). This suggests that there were convex returns to
schooling in the Republican era, which then were eliminated in the Mao era, before reappearing in
the post-Mao era.
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Figure A2: Persistence of educational attainment across cohorts. Both panels show coefficients on
fathers’ educational attainment from a regression of children’s educational attainment on fathers’
educational attainment. Regressions are estimated for five-year periods, which “roll” across birth
cohorts (the year plotted is the center of the five-year interval). Educational attainment among
children and fathers is measured using the log of children’s and fathers’ years of schooling. Panel
A shows coefficients estimated from regressions without any control variables. Panel B shows
coefficients estimated from regressions that include controls for cohort-specific effects of gender,
cohort-specific effects of fathers’ and children’s Communist Party membership status; and quadratic
controls for fathers’ ages and children’s ages (the quadratic controls for fathers’ ages are also cohort-
specific). All regressions estimated using the UHS data described in the text.
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